

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(D)

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2012 12:57 PM
To: H
Subject: FW: Egypt info

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on: 01/24/2027

FYI

From: Patterson, Anne W
Sent: Tue 1/24/2012 6:39 AM
To: Feltman, Jeffrey D
Cc: Walles, Jacob
Subject: RE: Egypt info

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2012 4:21 AM
To: Patterson, Anne W
Cc: Walles, Jacob
Subject: Fw: Egypt info

Anne, FYI -- intriguing analysis from Jake Sullivan and my response. (Hi from Moscow.)
Jeffrey Feltman

From: Feltman, Jeffrey D
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 09:20 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Egypt info

[Redacted]

1.4(D)
B1

Jeffrey Feltman

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 07:22 PM
To: Feltman, Jeffrey D

Subject: Egypt info

Interested, as usual, in your views of the below.

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. An individual with extremely sensitive access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) stated in strict confidence, that on January 20 and 21, 2012 Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, the leaders of the MB, and their political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), engaged in an extremely active series of discreet, and in some cases secret, meetings. These sessions were held in an effort to consolidate the MB position following their success in the final round of elections for the lower house of parliament. In these meetings the MB leaders attempted to coordinate their plans to take full advantage of the electoral success. Having won between forty-five and fifty percent of the seats in the house, the MB leaders agreed among themselves that they must strike a balance between the Salafist al Nour Party, and selected members of the more liberal New Wafd Party, which will give them seventy-five percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament. At the same time, they are in close contact with officers of the ruling Supreme Committee for the Armed Forces (SCAF), in an effort to reassure them that the position of the military will be protected in the new Islamic Government of Egypt.

2. According to this individual, one of Badie's first decisions was to select Saad Al-Katany as speaker of the new house, after consultation with FJP chairman Mohamed Mursi. In the opinion of this individual, Badie saw that Mursi's bitter personal differences with al Nour leader Emad Abdul Ghaffour might complicate the alliance the MB wanted to pursue between the two major parties. Al-Katany is on better terms with Ghaffour, and according to this source, al-Nour has already agreed to work with the FJP on major issues, particularly as they relate to the drafting of the new constitution, and formation of the country's first civilian government. By working together, the FJP and al-Nour control seventy-two percent of the seats in the lower house, and Al-Katany has assured Badie, and the other MB leaders, that they can pick up the seats needed for a three quarters majority of the seats in parliament from sympathetic members of the New Wafd and other minority parties. New Wafd leader El -Sayyid el-Badawi has already been in touch with both Mursi and al-Katany in an effort to gain some benefit for his party from this situation.

3. (Source Comment: In the opinion of an extremely sensitive source, speaking in private, with this victory the MB will now guide Egypt quickly toward becoming an Islamic Republic, albeit one that can work with selected Western governments and firms. This individual believes that the next great challenge for the MB leaders will be avoiding the temptation to overplay their hand by allowing al Nour to pull them toward a stricter interpretation of Islamic Law in the new constitution. In this case they will still face a threat from the military, if any of these steps lead to efforts to take legal action against Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and the other leaders of the SCAF. If they are patient and allow the military to maintain its place in society, the MB will, in the opinion of this individual, be able to count on the support of the rank and file soldiers, who, according to MB polling, strongly support the establishment of an Islamic state.)

4. According to a sensitive source, the MB is committed to maintaining and building economic relations with Western firms and businesses; however, these Western entities must understand that the new Egyptian Government will be completely committed to the rule of Islamic Law and this commitment must be respected. In the opinion of this individual, the new Egyptian Government will redefine the relationship with the state of Israel, and while stopping short of supporting military action against Israel, they will distance themselves from the past era of cooperation. The most immediate result of this change, in the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, will be an end to cooperation with the Israeli security forces in controlling the movement of Hamas troops and equipment across the Egyptian border at Gaza. This particular individual believes that the Egyptian military and intelligence services will eventually begin to provide increased clandestine assistance to Hamas.

5. (Source Comment: According to this same individual, when Badie, Mursi, and al-Katany were told that Mohamed El Baradei had withdrawn as a presidential candidate, al-Katany stated that the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the United Nations realized that the new constitution would now be drafted in a manner that made the President a ceremonial figure, with real power resting in the parliament and, by extension, the Prime Minister's office. The MB/FJP leaders expect that former Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa will probably win the presidential election. Badie noted that this would be no problem, and might serve their purpose, since it would reassure Tantawi, who has a good relationship with Moussa. At the same time, according to this source, the MB leaders believe Moussa will be satisfied with a ceremonial role as president and will not challenge the power of the MB controlled parliament. They had been somewhat concerned that El Baradei expected to serve as both head of state and government, which would have posed a problem for the MB. According to this source, El Baradei, like Moussa, had past ties to the MB, but had become personally ambitious during his years at the UN offices in Vienna.)